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An Automated Framework for Board-Level Trojan Benchmarking
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems ( IF 2.7 ) Pub Date : 5-30-2022 , DOI: 10.1109/tcad.2022.3178643
Aritra Bhattacharyay 1 , Shuo Yang 1 , Jonathan Cruz 1 , Prabuddha Chakraborty 1 , Swarup Bhunia 1 , Tamzidul Hoque 2
Affiliation  

Economic and operational advantages have led the supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) to incorporate various untrusted entities. Any of the untrusted entities are capable of introducing malicious alterations to facilitate a functional failure or leakage of secret information during field operation. While researchers have been investigating the threat of malicious modification within the scale of individual microelectronic components, the possibility of a board-level malicious manipulation has essentially been unexplored. In the absence of standard benchmarking solutions, prospective countermeasures for PCB trust assurance are likely to utilize homegrown representation of the attacks that undermine their evaluation and do not provide scope for comparison with other techniques. In this article, we have developed a benchmarking solution to facilitate an unbiased and comparable evaluation of countermeasures applicable to PCB trust assurance. Based on a taxonomy tailored for PCB-level alterations, we have developed a toolflow for the automatic generation of Trojan benchmarks to facilitate a comprehensive evaluation against a large number of diverse Trojan implementations and application of data mining for trust verification. Using the toolflow, we have developed a suite of custom “Trojan benchmarks” (i.e., PCB designs with Trojans) containing representative examples of Trojans in the taxonomy inserted in different PCB designs of varying complexity and functionality. Finally, with experimental measurements from a fabricated PCB and structural analysis of netlist, we analyze the stealthiness of the Trojan designs and present the runtime of the tool for a large number of PCB designs.

中文翻译:


板级特洛伊木马基准测试的自动化框架



经济和运营优势导致印刷电路板(PCB)供应链纳入了各种不受信任的实体。任何不受信任的实体都能够引入恶意更改,以在现场操作期间导致功能故障或秘密信息泄露。虽然研究人员一直在调查单个微电子元件范围内恶意修改的威胁,但基本上尚未探索板级恶意操纵的可能性。在缺乏标准基准测试解决方案的情况下,PCB 信任保证的预期对策可能会利用本土的攻击表示形式,从而破坏其评估,并且不提供与其他技术进行比较的范围。在本文中,我们开发了一个基准测试解决方案,以促进对适用于 PCB 信任保证的对策进行公正且可比较的评估。基于针对PCB级改造的分类法,我们开发了自动生成木马基准的工具流程,以便于对大量不同的木马实现进行综合评估,并应用数据挖掘进行信任验证。使用该工具流程,我们开发了一套自定义“特洛伊木马基准”(即带有特洛伊木马的 PCB 设计),其中包含插入到不同复杂性和功能的不同 PCB 设计中的分类法中特洛伊木马的代表性示例。最后,通过对制造的PCB的实验测量和网表的结构分析,我们分析了木马设计的隐蔽性,并展示了该工具在大量PCB设计中的运行时间。
更新日期:2024-08-28
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