Abstract

Recent literature on Spinoza has emphasized his commitment to universal intelligibility, understood as the claim that there are no brute facts. We draw attention to an important but overlooked element of Spinoza's commitment to intelligibility, and thereby question its most prominent interpretation, on which this commitment results in the priority of conceptual relations. We argue that such readings are both incomplete in their account of Spinozistic intelligibility and mistaken in their identification of the most fundamental relation. We argue that Spinoza is one of the first moderns to address the problem of conditions of intelligibility, and show that, in his metaphysics, expressive relations are best understood as relations of dependence for intelligibility: what a thing ‘expresses’ is its condition of intelligibility, that which determines how, through what concepts, it can be conceived.

中文翻译：

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斯宾诺莎论可理解性的表达和根据

摘要

最近关于斯宾诺莎的文献强调了他对普遍可理解性的承诺，这被理解为声称没有残酷的事实。我们提请注意斯宾诺莎对可理解性的承诺中一个重要但被忽视的因素，因此质疑其最突出的解释，这种承诺导致概念关系的优先级。我们认为，这样的解读在他们对斯宾诺莎的可理解性的描述上是不完整的，在他们对最基本的关系的识别上是错误的。我们认为斯宾诺莎是第一批解决可理解性条件问题的现代人之一，并表明，在他的形而上学中，表达关系最好理解为对可理解性的依赖关系：一个事物“表达”的是它的可理解性条件，它决定了如何通过什么概念来构思它。