ABSTRACT

Some philosophers think that life is worth living not merely because of the goods and the bads within it, but also because life itself is good. I explain how this idea can be formalized by associating each version of the view with a function from length of life to the value generated by life itself. Then I argue that every version of the view that life itself is good faces some version of the following dilemma: either (1) good human lives are worse than very long lives wholly devoid of pleasure, desire-satisfaction, knowledge, or any other goods, or (2) very short lives containing nothing but suffering are worth living. Since neither result is plausible, we ought to reject the view that life itself is good. On the view that I favour, any given life might be worth living because of the goods that it contains, but life itself is neutral.

摘要

一些哲学家认为，生命值得活下去，不仅因为其中的好与坏，还因为生命本身是好的。我解释了如何通过将视图的每个版本与从生命长度到生命本身产生的价值的函数相关联来形式化这个想法。然后我认为，生活本身是美好的观点的每个版本都面临以下困境的某个版本：要么（1）美好的人类生活比完全没有快乐、欲望满足、知识或任何其他物品的非常长寿的生活更糟糕，或者（2）只有痛苦的短暂生命是值得过的。由于这两种结果都不合理，我们应该拒绝认为生活本身是美好的。我赞成的观点是，任何给定的生命都可能因为它所包含的东西而值得活下去，但生命本身是中性的。