This paper explores the question of what makes an action morally worthy. I start with a popular theory of moral worth which roughly states that a right action is morally praiseworthy if and only if it is performed in response to the reasons which make the action right. While I think the account provides promising foundations for determining praiseworthiness, I argue that the view lacks the resources to adequately satisfy important desiderata associated with theories of moral worth. Firstly, the view does not adequately capture the degree to which an action has moral worth, and secondly, the view does not identify if right actions produced from overdetermined motives have moral worth. However, all is not lost; I also argue that the account can satisfy the desiderata when it attends to the agent’s counterfactual motives in addition to their actual motives. By considering counterfactual motives, we can measure the robustness of the actual praiseworthy motive, and attending to motivational robustness allows the new proposal to fully satisfy the two desiderata. At the end of this paper, I respond to some criticisms typically brought against a counterfactual view of moral worth.

本文探讨了什么使行为具有道德价值的问题。我从一个流行的道德价值理论开始，它粗略地指出，当且仅当它是针对使该行为正确的原因而进行的，正确的行为在道德上是值得称赞的。虽然我认为该说明为确定值得称道提供了有希望的基础，但我认为该观点缺乏充分满足与道德价值理论相关的重要需求的资源。首先，该观点没有充分捕捉行为具有道德价值的程度，其次，该观点没有确定由过度确定的动机产生的正确行为是否具有道德价值。然而，一切都没有丢失；我还认为，除了代理人的实际动机之外，该账户还可以满足代理人的反事实动机。通过考虑反事实动机，我们可以衡量实际值得称赞的动机的稳健性，关注动机稳健性可以让新提案完全满足这两个需求。在本文的结尾，我回应了一些通常针对道德价值的反事实观点提出的批评。