The transition to low-carbon economies requires massive investments into renewable energies, which are commonly supported through regulatory frameworks. Yet, governments can have incentives – and the ability – to deviate from previously announced support policies once those investments have been made, which can deter investments. We analyze a renewable energy dynamic regulation game and derive under what conditions governments have incentives to deviate from their commitments. We then consider the effects of different support policy regimes and deployment targets on compliance. Last, with a numerical application of the model, we explain why Spain conducted retrospective changes in the period 2010–2013 whereas Germany stuck to its commitments.

向低碳经济转型需要对可再生能源进行大量投资，这通常得到监管框架的支持。然而，一旦进行了这些投资，政府可以有激励措施——也有能力——偏离先前宣布的支持政策，这可能会阻碍投资。我们分析了可再生能源动态监管博弈，并得出在什么条件下政府有动机偏离其承诺。然后，我们考虑不同支持政策制度和部署目标对合规性的影响。最后，通过模型的数值应用，我们解释了为什么西班牙在 2010-2013 年期间进行了回顾性变化，而德国则坚持其承诺。