Credit purchasing has seen dramatic growth recently, stimulating online platforms to provide online credit services in competition with the credit card. We build a game-theoretical model to explore the platform's credit entry strategy when facing the credit card competition. Consumers differ in their credit card ownership and disposable personal incomes (DPI), and perceive a hassle cost of the credit purchase. We find that online credit offering brings an increased retail price. When the proportion of credit card ownership is high, the bank and platform subsidize consumers when the credit misfit cost is low, but charge an interest rate otherwise in an integrated system where the platform acts as a seller. However, the platform will never subsidize consumers in independent system where the retailer sells through the platform. The platform will enter the credit market only when the fixed entry cost is sufficiently low in integrated system, but only when the commission fee or misfit cost is large in independent system. When the proportion of credit card ownership is low, the platform will subsidize consumers when consumer dispersion in DPI is large or misfit cost is low. In addition, the platform has a high willingness to choose the entry strategy when the commission fee is large or misfit cost is low in independent case. Discussion and extension verify the robustness of basic model.

近来信用购买出现了大幅增长，刺激了在线平台提供在线信用服务与信用卡竞争。我们建立了一个博弈论模型来探索平台在面对信用卡竞争时的信用准入策略。消费者在他们的信用卡所有权和可支配个人收入 (DPI) 方面存在差异，并且认为信用卡购买的麻烦成本。我们发现在线信贷提供提高了零售价格。当信用卡持有比例高时，银行和平台在信用错配成本低时补贴消费者，否则在平台充当卖方的集成系统中收取利率。但是，平台永远不会补贴零售商通过平台销售的独立系统中的消费者。只有在集成系统的固定进入成本足够低时，平台才会进入信用市场，而在独立系统中，只有当佣金或错配成本较大时，平台才会进入信用市场。在信用卡持卡比例低的情况下，当消费者在 DPI 中的分散度大或错配成本低时，平台会补贴消费者。此外，平台在独立案例中佣金大或错配成本低时选择入场策略的意愿高。讨论和扩展验证了基本模型的稳健性。当消费者在 DPI 中分散较大或错配成本较低时，平台将对消费者进行补贴。此外，平台在独立案例中佣金大或错配成本低时选择入场策略的意愿高。讨论和扩展验证了基本模型的稳健性。当消费者在 DPI 中分散较大或错配成本较低时，平台将对消费者进行补贴。此外，平台在独立案例中佣金大或错配成本低时选择入场策略的意愿高。讨论和扩展验证了基本模型的稳健性。