The phenomenon of a platform owner entering its complementor spaces has been growing and, given its potential impact on the dynamics of competition in platform-mediated industries, has captured the interest of entrepreneurs, scholars, and policy makers. Empirical studies on the consequences of such platform owner entry have been scant so far and show mixed results for complementors. Drawing on competitive dynamics theory, our paper revisits an implicit assumption held in extant studies that allows us to hypothesize on dissimilar entry modes across owners, to study the implications of entry mode differences. We argue that how an owner enters its complementor spaces drives the level of competitive pressure that such an entry exerts on the affected complementors. In turn, this determines the size and valence of the repercussions on complementors’ product performance as well as their responses. Drawing on platform theory, we argue that an owner’s mode of entry into complementor spaces relates to that owner’s approach to platform governance. Using a unique panel dataset of health and fitness mobile apps in the Apple iOS and Google Play store, our results support our prediction that the mode of entry plays a significant role in the resulting complementor dynamics. We find contrasting modes of entry and resulting dynamics that arise between a platform that follows a closed and reigning approach to governance and one that follows an open and laissez-faire approach. Our findings help explain apparent contradictions in prior studies and extend our understanding of this increasingly common phenomenon in platform-mediated industries.

中文翻译：

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不同治理模式下平台所有者进入互补空间

平台所有者进入其互补空间的现象一直在增长，鉴于其对平台中介行业竞争动态的潜在影响，已引起企业家、学者和政策制定者的兴趣。迄今为止，关于此类平台所有者进入后果的实证研究很少，并且对补充者的结果喜忧参半。利用竞争动态理论，我们的论文重新审视了现有研究中的一个隐含假设，该假设允许我们假设所有者之间的不同进入模式，以研究进入模式差异的影响。我们认为，所有者如何进入其互补空间会驱动这种进入对受影响的互补空间施加的竞争压力水平。反过来，这决定了对互补者产品性能及其反应的影响的大小和效价。借鉴平台理论，我们认为所有者进入互补空间的模式与所有者的平台治理方法有关。使用 Apple iOS 和 Google Play 商店中健康和健身移动应用程序的独特面板数据集，我们的结果支持我们的预测，即进入模式在由此产生的补充动态中起着重要作用。我们发现，在遵循封闭和主导治理方法的平台与遵循开放和自由放任方法的平台之间出现了对比的进入模式和由此产生的动态。