Traditional agency theory views the proper role of the board chair exclusively as providing independent oversight to monitor and control the CEO. Recently, firms have introduced innovations in board leadership that have confounded these theoretical expectations. One notable innovation is the executive board chair, a corporate governance hybrid responsible for both oversight and strategic decision-making, challenging agency theory's prescription that the two activities remain separate. In this study, we argue that an executive board chair position can resolve the trade-off between independent oversight and involvement in strategy and therefore generate a performance advantage. We also predict that, owing to the blurring of lines between the CEO and board chair roles that the executive board chair position creates, the relationship will be stronger the greater the need to monitor and control the CEO but weaker when organizational complexity and board leadership demands are greater. Analysis of S&P 1500 firms from 2003 to 2017 provides general support for our arguments.

中文翻译：

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执行董事会主席：检查公司治理混合体的绩效后果

传统的代理理论认为，董事会主席的适当角色完全是提供独立监督以监督和控制首席执行官。最近，公司在董事会领导力方面引入了创新，但这些创新却颠覆了这些理论预期。一项值得注意的创新是执行董事会主席，这是一个负责监督和战略决策的公司治理混合体，挑战了代理理论关于这两项活动保持独立的规定。在这项研究中，我们认为执行董事会主席职位可以解决独立监督和参与战略之间的权衡，从而产生绩效优势。我们还预测，由于执行董事会主席职位造成首席执行官和董事会主席角色之间的界限变得模糊，对首席执行官的监督和控制的需求越大，这种关系就会越强，但当组织复杂性和董事会领导力要求较高时，这种关系就会减弱。更大。对 2003 年至 2017 年标准普尔1500 指数公司的分析为我们的论点提供了总体支持。