In this paper we propose a mechanism for the allocation of pipeline capacities, assuming that the participants bidding for capacities do have subjective evaluation of various network routes. The proposed mechanism is based on the concept of bidding for route-quantity pairs. Each participant defines a limited number of routes and places multiple bids, corresponding to various quantities, on each of these routes. The proposed mechanism assigns a convex combination of the submitted bids to each participant, thus its called convex combinatorial auction. The capacity payments in the proposed model are determined according to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves principle. We compare the efficiency of the proposed algorithm with a simplified model of the method currently used for pipeline capacity allocation in the EU (simultaneous ascending clock auction of pipeline capacities) via simulation, according to various measures, such as resulting and net utility of players, utilization of network capacities, total income of the auctioneer and fairness.

在本文中，我们提出了一种管道容量分配机制，假设投标容量的参与者确实对各种网络路线有主观评价。所提出的机制基于对路线数量对进行投标的概念。每个参与者定义有限数量的路线，并在每条路线上放置多个对应于不同数量的投标。所提出的机制将提交的投标的凸组合分配给每个参与者，因此称为凸组合拍卖。提议模型中的容量支付是根据 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 原则确定的。