The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is divisive: while some believe it provides an unprecedentedly powerful approach to address the ‘hard problem’, others dismiss it on grounds that it is untestable. We argue that the appeal and applicability of IIT can be greatly widened if we distinguish two flavours of the theory: strong IIT, which identifies consciousness with specific properties associated with maxima of integrated information; and weak IIT, which tests pragmatic hypotheses relating aspects of consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics. We review challenges for strong IIT, explain how existing empirical findings are well explained by weak IIT without needing to commit to the entirety of strong IIT, and discuss the outlook for both flavours of IIT.

意识的综合信息论 (IIT) 存在分歧：虽然一些人认为它提供了一种前所未有的强大方法来解决“难题”，但另一些人则认为它是不可测试的。我们认为，如果我们区分两种类型的理论，IIT 的吸引力和适用性可以大大拓宽：强 IIT，它识别具有与集成信息最大值相关的特定属性的意识；和弱 IIT，它测试将意识的各个方面与更广泛的信息动态测量相关的实用假设。我们回顾了强 IIT 面临的挑战，解释了现有的实证研究结果如何被弱 IIT 很好地解释，而无需致力于整个强 IIT，并讨论了两种 IIT 风格的前景。