A powerful idea put forward in the recent philosophy of science literature is that scientific models are best understood as instruments, tools or, more generally, artifacts. This idea has thus far been developed in combination with the more traditional representational approach: accordingly, current artifactualist accounts treat models as representational tools. But artifactualism and representationalism are independent views, and adopting one does not require acceptance of the other. This paper argues that a leaner version of artifactualism, free of representationalist assumptions, is both desirable and viable. Taking seriously the idea that models are artifacts can help us philosophically to make sense of how and why scientific modeling works even without reference to representation.

在最近的科学哲学哲学中提出的一个强有力的观点是，最好将科学模型理解为仪器、工具，或更一般地说，是人工制品。迄今为止，这个想法已经与更传统的表征方法相结合：因此，当前的人工制品帐户将模型视为表征工具。但人造主义和再现主义是独立的观点，采用一种观点并不需要接受另一种观点。本文认为，没有代表性假设的人工制品的精简版本是可取的和可行的。认真对待模型是人工制品的想法可以帮助我们从哲学上理解科学建模是如何以及为什么工作的，即使不参考表示。