1 A PLURALITY OF MORAL FOUNDATIONS

In Concern, Respect, & Cooperation, Garrett Cullity defends a pluralist account of morality, whereby moral reasons for behaviour and attitudes rest on more than one foundation, none of which is reducible to others. Two of the pillars on which he builds his account are commonly taken to be in tension: concern for others’ welfare, and respect for their agency. Controversially, Cullity sees a role for both. But more intriguing again is the third pillar, which he presents most simply (i.e., minus the caveats) as follows:

“Our worthwhile collective action calls for my action of joining in.”

In Cullity's words: “I want to take seriously the idea that when people manifest this form of decency, they are following norms that are just as fundamental to morality as the norms for concern and respect. The question ‘Why join in worthwhile collective actions?’ is like ‘Why help people who need it?’ or ‘Why allow others to live their own lives?’” (52).

But these questions are not obviously on a par. The response “because they are persons” seems adequate for the latter two questions. But it is not an evidently adequate response to the first. What is so important, after all, about acting together? It is not obvious that a fundamental way of recognising others as persons is to team up with them to pursue joint ends.

As with many aspects of this rich book, whether or not one agrees with Cullity's inclusion of cooperation as a moral foundation, the idea is original and fruitful. It is worth considering what a fundamental norm of cooperation would plausibly look like. In this comment I initially lay out Cullity's own characterisation, and ultimately build from this a much fuller picture of the norm, albeit pushing it in a direction that Cullity may not endorse. I claim, however, that there is no alternative. The more salient ways of understanding the norm are neither convincing nor helpful for filling in crucial details. My own proposal draws on the rich findings of game theory regarding the tragedies of individualist reasoning, or what is known as collective action problems.

中文翻译：

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共同行动的独特道德重要性

1 多种道德基础

在《关注、尊重和合作》中，加勒特·库里蒂捍卫了一种对道德的多元解释，即行为和态度的道德理由建立在一个以上的基础上，没有一个可以简化为其他基础。他建立帐户的两个支柱通常被认为是紧张的：关心他人的福利和尊重他们的能动性。有争议的是，Culity 认为两者都可以发挥作用。但更有趣的是第三个支柱，他最简单地介绍（即减去警告）如下：

“我们有价值的集体行动需要我的加入。”

用 Culity 的话来说：“我想认真对待这样一种观点，即当人们表现出这种形式的体面时，他们所遵循的规范与关心和尊重的规范同样重要。'为什么要加入有价值的集体行动？就像“为什么要帮助需要它的人？” 或“为什么要让别人过自己的生活？”（52）。

但这些问题显然并不相同。对于后两个问题，“因为他们是人”的回答似乎已经足够了。但这显然不是对第一个的充分回应。毕竟，一起行动有什么重要的呢？将他人视为人的基本方法是与他们合作以追求共同目标，这一点并不明显。

与这本丰富的书的许多方面一样，无论人们是否同意库利蒂将合作作为道德基础，这个想法都是独创且富有成果的。值得考虑的是，合作的基本规范看起来会是什么样子。在这篇评论中，我最初列出了 Culity 自己的特征，并最终以此为基础构建了更全面的规范图景，尽管将其推向了 Culity 可能不认可的方向。然而，我声称没有其他选择。理解规范的更突出的方式既无说服力，也无助于填写关键细节。我自己的提议借鉴了博弈论关于个人主义推理悲剧或所谓的集体行动问题的丰富发现。