We analyze the effects of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements restricting incentive compensation of material risk-takers in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements have a robustly positive effect on risk-management effort only if the bank manager's outside option is sufficiently high; otherwise, their effectiveness depends on the dynamics of information arrival. Stringent deferral requirements unambiguously backfire. Our normative analysis characterizes whether and how deferral and clawback requirements should supplement capital regulation as part of the optimal policy mix.

中文翻译：

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延期和回拨要求的经济学

我们分析了监管干预对薪酬合同的影响，重点关注最近限制金融部门重大风险承担者激励性薪酬的强制性延期和回拨要求。只有当银行经理的外部选择权足够高时，适度的延期要求才会对风险管理工作产生强烈的积极影响；否则，它们的有效性取决于信息到达的动态。严格的延期要求无疑适得其反。我们的规范分析描述了延期和回拨要求是否以及如何作为最佳政策组合的一部分补充资本监管。