ABSTRACT

Hybrid and pluralist accounts of concepts agree that the class of concepts includes a multiplicity of heterogeneous representational structures, such as prototypes, sets of exemplars and theories. In this paper I argue that these accounts agree on two additional central claims related to the ways in which they articulate those structures: each type of representational structure can be used independently in psychological processes, and co-referential concepts are associated in a distinctive way as representations of the same category. Although they disagree on concept individuation, they seem to agree that on a processing dimension there are multiple independent representations for a given category and on a long-term storage dimension concepts that represent the same category conform an epistemic unity.

摘要

概念的混合和多元主义解释一致认为，概念类别包括多种异质表征结构，例如原型、范例集和理论。在这篇论文中，我认为这些解释同意另外两个与它们表达这些结构的方式相关的中心主张：每种类型的表征结构都可以在心理过程中独立使用，并且共同指称概念以一种独特的方式相关联同一类别的表示。尽管他们不同意概念个体化，但他们似乎同意，在处理维度上，给定类别有多个独立表示，而在长期存储维度上，表示同一类别的概念符合认知统一性。