ABSTRACT We argue that two key party system characteristics – the effective number of parties and electoral volatility – have a curvilinear, inverted-U shaped, influence on public goods provision. Rejecting the linear pattern generally assumed in the literature, we contend that optimal governance outcomes will be observed at intermediate levels of party system size and stability. Only under these conditions will the benefits of competition be balanced against the risks of fragmentation. We find support for our arguments by employing new data and estimating panel models of public goods provision in 29 Indian states and territories. We hope that our findings will contribute to understanding how party systems function, particularly those at the subnational level, and will better inform how they can be leveraged for development and good governance. We also hope that they will provide some guidance about the future trajectory of public policy in the Indian states.

中文翻译：

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政党制度和公共产品：印度各邦善政的动态

摘要 我们认为，政党制度的两个关键特征——政党的有效数量和选举的波动性——对公共产品的供给具有曲线的、倒 U 形的影响。拒绝文献中通常假设的线性模式，我们认为最佳治理结果将在政党制度规模和稳定性的中间水平上观察到。只有在这些条件下，竞争的好处才能与碎片化的风险相平衡。我们通过使用新数据和估计印度 29 个州和地区的公共产品供应的面板模型来为我们的论点找到支持。我们希望我们的研究结果将有助于了解政党系统如何运作，尤其是在地方层面的系统，并将更好地告知如何利用它们来促进发展和良好治理。