Abstract Governments often adopt hedging strategies to mitigate risks they face in international affairs. They hedge in the conventional, financial sense of the term by seeking to offset risks in global markets. They also adopt strategies to hedge against international security hazards by preserving strategic ambiguity, forging limited security alignments, and cultivating modest self-protection in case potential threats materialize. Both types of hedging typically are seen as prudent behavior. However, hedging strategies sometimes fail. Risks can be difficult to calculate, and the measures needed to hedge against them can be costly. Hedging international security risks can be particularly challenging, as governments sometimes lack access to adequate protective options at any price. This article illustrates the argument with two contrasting cases: relatively successful Southeast Asian hedging against the risk of financial calamity after the 1997 crisis and less effective efforts by some of the same states to hedge against the security risk of Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea.

中文翻译：

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对冲策略的可变有效性

摘要 各国政府经常采取对冲策略来降低其在国际事务中面临的风险。他们通过寻求抵消全球市场的风险，在传统的金融意义上对冲。他们还采取策略，通过保持战略模糊性、建立有限的安全联盟以及在潜在威胁成为现实时培养适度的自我保护来对冲国际安全风险。两种类型的对冲通常都被视为审慎行为。然而，对冲策略有时会失败。风险可能难以计算，对冲风险所需的措施可能代价高昂。对冲国际安全风险可能特别具有挑战性，因为政府有时无法以任何代价获得足够的保护选择。