AbstractIn this contribution, we argue that Moore's paradox has its roots in the semantics of first-person. We build up on some of Frege's concerns about the first-person, recently revived by Kripke as a criticism of the position according to which Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics is all is needed for an adequate semantics of the first-person. First, we discuss the so-called pragmatic approach to Moore's paradox, discussing its possible limitations, in accordance with some ideas expressed on the matter by Shoemaker. Second, we show that sentences where a predicate expressing a “phenomenal” property combines with a first-person pronoun are bound to express Stalnaker's diagonal proposition, and are true a priori. Crucially, the proposition expressed does not correspond to the ascription of a property to an independently established object. Finally, we provide significant empirical evidence to the effect that this emerging “subjective” layer of meaning is actually what is needed to solve some of the puzzles around Moore's paradox: the status of Moore's sentences essentially depends, in fact, on the interaction between the “objective” and the “subjective” layers of meaning.

中文翻译：

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摩尔悖论的第一人称和语义根源

摘要在这篇文章中，我们认为摩尔悖论的根源在于第一人称的语义。我们建立在弗雷格对第一人称的一些担忧的基础上，最近由 Kripke 重新提出，作为对 Kaplan 的二维语义对于第一人称的充分语义所必需的立场的批评。首先，我们根据舒梅克就此事表达的一些想法，讨论摩尔悖论的所谓务实方法，讨论其可能的局限性。其次，我们证明了表达“现象”属性的谓词与第一人称代词结合的句子必然表达 Stalnaker 的对角命题，并且是先验的。至关重要的是，所表达的命题不对应于将属性归属于独立建立的对象。最后，我们提供了重要的经验证据，表明这一新兴的“主观”意义层实际上是解决围绕摩尔悖论的一些难题所需要的：摩尔句子的状态实际上取决于“客观”和“主观”的意义层。