In this article, I revisit the arguments in, and address some concerns about, an earlier article of mine, ‘The Office of Ownership.’ This article makes two main points. The first is about the ways in which a transfer of property from one person to another affects the obligations of third parties. I continue to defend the earlier article’s claim that, by thinking about the obligations owed to owners of property as being owed to ‘the owner,’ rather than to the particular named person who happens to be the owner, we can maintain both the idea that property rights are in rem and the idea that they partake of private law’s distinctive bilateral normativity. The second is about the extent to which the notion of an office is helpful in thinking about ownership. There is reason to doubt that it is, notably because owners’ powers are typically not bounded in the way that office-holders’ powers seem to be. But I argue that, at least some of the time, particularly in contexts where owners are able to exercise powers that bind their successors in title, such as by creating easements, leases, or running covenants, the powers of ownership do seem bounded by their purpose.

中文翻译：

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重新审视所有权办公室

在本文中，我重新审视了我之前的一篇文章“所有权办公室”中的论点，并解决了一些担忧。这篇文章有两个要点。第一个是关于财产从一个人转移到另一个人影响第三方义务的方式。我继续捍卫前一篇文章的主张，即通过将对财产所有者的义务视为对“所有者”的义务，而不是对碰巧是所有者的特定姓名的人，我们可以保持以下观点：财产权是对物的，并且认为它们参与了私法独特的双边规范性。第二个是关于办公室的概念在多大程度上有助于思考所有权。有理由怀疑它是，尤其是因为所有者的权力通常不受公职人员权力的限制。但我认为，至少在某些时候，特别是在所有者能够行使约束其继任者的权利的情况下，例如通过创建地役权、租约或运行契约，所有权似乎确实受到他们的约束。目的。