This paper endogenizes intervention in financial crises as the strategic negotiation between a regulator and creditors of distressed banks. Incentives for banks to contribute to a voluntary bail-in arise from their exposure to financial contagion. In equilibrium, a bail-in is possible only if the regulator’s threat to not bail out insolvent banks is credible. Contrary to models without intervention or with government bailouts only, sparse networks enhance welfare for two main reasons: they improve the credibility of the regulator’s no-bailout threat for large shocks, and they reduce free-riding incentives among bail-in contributors when the threat is credible.

中文翻译：

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纾困和纾困：激励、连通性和系统稳定性

本文将金融危机的干预内生化为监管机构与陷入困境银行的债权人之间的战略谈判。银行为自愿纾困做出贡献的动机来自于它们面临金融传染的风险。在均衡情况下，只有当监管机构不救助资不抵债的银行的威胁可信时，才有可能进行救助。与没有干预或只有政府救助的模型相反，稀疏网络提高福利的主要原因有两个：它们提高了监管机构对大型冲击的无救助威胁的可信度，以及当威胁发生时，它们减少了救助提供者之间的搭便车激励。是可信的。