We study governance when shareholders vote and can also buy or sell shares. We find that voting for the policy that one believes is better for the firm maximizes portfolio value only when pivotal; otherwise, it is better to vote against one’s information, distort the market, and then trade at the distorted price. Equilibrium voting informativeness balances these forces and is demonstrably low. As the number of shareholders grows, the probability of making the correct decision becomes lower than the informational quality of just one shareholder’s private signal. Despite this, shareholders extract information rents from trading and thus obtain additional value from their private information. These effects are related to the level of direct information leakage in the market. The predicted patterns of trading and market volatility help reconcile several debates.

我们研究股东投票时的治理，也可以买卖股票。我们发现，投票支持人们认为对公司更好的政策只会在关键时最大化投资组合价值；否则，最好投反对票，扭曲市场，然后以扭曲的价格交易。均衡投票的信息量平衡了这些力量，并且明显很低。随着股东数量的增加，做出正确决策的概率变得低于仅一个股东私人信号的信息质量。尽管如此，股东还是从交易中提取信息租金，从而从他们的私人信息中获得额外的价值。这些影响与市场中直接信息泄露的程度有关。