The existing regulatory regime for single firm exclusionary activity is primarily to establish a dominant position for a finding of an abuse, but there are challenges coming out of relevant market definition, market power determination, and the efficiency or innovation justifications. This paper argues for an alternative solution: an effects-based analysis methodology for regulating platforms which are not proven to be dominant. Based on case studies including the Alibaba decision, JD.com case, Meituan case, and Visa case, it follows that we should stay focused on foreclosure effects while specifying the type of conduct that calls for careful scrutiny. But it is controversial to apply the traditional leverage theory and essential facilities doctrine to digital markets, which are of great significance to the determination of foreclosure effects. This paper introduces a “related markets hypothesis” to illustrate the leverage of market power, and applies a modified “costs-based test” to determine whether the data resources held by the platform constitute a bottleneck. This paper finally proposes a classification scheme different from the criteria on a basis of company size. The decisive factors for classification include: form of platform enterprises, behavioral pattern, nature of market, market structure, and the competitive environment in related markets.

中文翻译：

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对我国互联网平台垄断法律规制的再思考

现有的针对单一公司排他性活动的监管制度主要是为发现滥用行为确立主导地位，但相关市场定义、市场支配力确定以及效率或创新理由方面存在挑战。本文提出了一种替代解决方案：一种基于效果的分析方法，用于调节未被证明占主导地位的平台。根据阿里巴巴案、京东案、美团案、Visa案等案例研究，我们应该继续关注止赎效应，同时明确需要仔细审查的行为类型。但将传统的杠杆理论和必要设施理论应用于数字市场存在争议，这对于确定止赎效果具有重要意义。本文引入“相关市场假设”来说明市场力量的杠杆作用，并应用修改后的“基于成本的测试”来确定平台持有的数据资源是否构成瓶颈。本文最后提出了一种不同于基于公司规模的标准的分类方案。分类的决定性因素包括：平台企业的形式、行为模式、市场性质、市场结构以及相关市场的竞争环境。