How do dictators coup-proof their armed forces from within the barracks? Coup-proofing is an important aspect of autocratic survival, but execution can be challenging due to the secrecy of plots and the vast size of the armed forces. Counterbalanced state security forces are more effective at resisting coups, but less effective at noticing signs of plots before they can be launched. If dictators wish to prevent coup attempts from occurring in the first place, they may decide to recruit and commission cadres of loyalists directly into the armed forces as political officers, tasked with monitoring for and reporting signs of disloyalty within the ranks. This article explores the development and use of these political officers within dictatorships, arguing that they are especially effective at preventing coup attempts. It also makes the case that their institutional design, while effective at detecting coup plots, makes them less useful at resisting coups that have reached the execution phase. I test these arguments on a cross-national sample of dictatorships from 1950 to 2010, finding strong evidence that political officers are incredibly effective coup detectors, but not coup resisters. These findings have important implications, particularly as several resilient modern dictatorships continue to rule with well-developed political officer systems.

中文翻译：

---

不要转身，镇上的 der Kommissar：专制政权中的政治官员和政变

独裁者如何在军营内发动政变？防政变是独裁生存的一个重要方面，但由于阴谋的保密性和武装部队的庞大规模，执行可能具有挑战性。平衡的国家安全部队在抵抗政变方面更有效，但在发动阴谋之前发现阴谋迹象的效率较低。如果独裁者希望从一开始就阻止政变企图的发生，他们可能会决定直接招募和委派忠诚者的干部作为政治官员进入武装部队，其任务是监测和报告军队中不忠的迹象。本文探讨了这些政治官员在独裁政权中的发展和使用，认为他们在防止政变企图方面特别有效。这也证明了他们的制度设计，虽然在发现政变阴谋方面很有效，但在抵抗已经进入执行阶段的政变方面不太有用。我在 1950 年至 2010 年的独裁统治的跨国样本中检验了这些论点，发现强有力的证据表明，政治官员是非常有效的政变探测器，但不是政变抵抗者。这些发现具有重要意义，特别是当几个有弹性的现代独裁政权继续通过完善的政治官员制度进行统治时。但不是政变抵抗者。这些发现具有重要意义，特别是当几个有弹性的现代独裁政权继续通过完善的政治官员制度进行统治时。但不是政变抵抗者。这些发现具有重要意义，特别是当几个有弹性的现代独裁政权继续通过完善的政治官员制度进行统治时。