We analyze the problem of international responsibility sharing for a refugee group seeking protection from the dangers of mass violence arising from inter-state conflict or the collapse of a fragile state. After reviewing several proposed solutions, we characterize responsibility sharing as a coordination problem in a simple sequential “moves” game between two potential host countries. We demonstrate that, ultimately, the country that makes the first move to receive refugees bears a disproportionate responsibility. We then draw on two historical case studies that illustrate the difficulties of coordinating a fair division of refugee responsibilities. To solve the coordination problem, we adapt a fair division procedure by inverting one first presented by Hugo Steinhaus for dividing “goods.” We demonstrate that the procedure is applicable to costly “obligations” under different scenarios and is manipulation proof, as each participating country has an obviously dominant strategy.

中文翻译：

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难民责任分担的协调与公平分工

我们分析了一个难民群体的国际责任分担问题，该群体寻求保护免受国家间冲突或脆弱国家崩溃引起的大规模暴力的危险。在审查了几个提出的解决方案后，我们将责任分担描述为两个潜在东道国之间简单的顺序“移动”博弈中的协调问题。我们证明，最终，率先接收难民的国家承担着不成比例的责任。然后，我们利用两个历史案例研究来说明协调公平分配难民责任的困难。为了解决协调问题，我们通过反转 Hugo Steinhaus 提出的用于划分“商品”的第一个程序来调整公平划分程序。