In the presence of incomplete information, strong states have an incentive to invest in costly signals that can differentiate them from weaker states. I argue that states can signal strength by handicapping themselves, deliberately reducing their combat effectiveness. In an ultimatum crisis bargaining model, I show that strong states can reduce the risk of war by making themselves weaker without reducing their demands. The key to this result is a comparative advantage that allows stronger types to fight more effectively with handicaps. This allows for an equilibrium where (1) stronger states adopt larger handicaps, thereby revealing their strength to the receiver, (2) larger handicaps are more likely to deter the receiver, and, (3) the positive risk of war precludes weaker types from imitating handicap signals. The ability to reveal strength peacefully has important ramifications for theories of mutual optimism, war termination, and the relationship between parity and war incidence.

中文翻译：

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有障碍的信号强度

在存在不完整信息的情况下，强国有动力投资于昂贵的信号，这些信号可以将它们与弱国区分开来。我认为，国家可以通过限制自己、故意降低其战斗力来发出力量信号。在最后通牒危机讨价还价模型中，我展示了强大的国家可以通过在不减少需求的情况下让自己变得更弱来降低战争风险。这个结果的关键是一个比较优势，它允许更强的类型更有效地对抗障碍。这允许平衡，其中（1）更强的国家采用更大的障碍，从而向接收者展示它们的实力，（2）更大的障碍更有可能阻止接收者，并且，（3）战争的积极风险排除了较弱的国家模仿障碍信号。