We study the dynamics of a major design choice in the governance of ventures: whether to distribute power at the top of the venture between a separate CEO and board chair. We propose that ventures are more likely to combine (separate) their CEO and chair positions when operational performance is poor (strong), demonstrating behavior in line with the threat rigidity thesis. Paradoxically, however, ventures would most benefit from a separate CEO and board chair when operational performance is poor. Empirical analysis of data from the Australian mining industry offers general support for our theory, with some interesting nuances. We discuss the implications of our findings for emerging conversations in the literatures on venture boards, boards of directors, and entrepreneurship.

我们研究了企业治理中一个主要设计选择的动态：是否在独立的 CEO 和董事会主席之间分配企业最高层的权力。我们建议，当运营绩效不佳（强）时，企业更有可能合并（分离）其 CEO 和董事长职位，展示符合威胁刚性论点的行为。然而，自相矛盾的是，当运营绩效不佳时，风险投资最能从单独的 CEO 和董事会主席中受益。对澳大利亚采矿业数据的实证分析为我们的理论提供了总体支持，但存在一些有趣的细微差别。我们讨论了我们的发现对风险投资委员会、董事会和企业家精神文献中新兴对话的影响。