This paper contributes to Comparative Political Economy (CPE) by developing an analytical concept of corporate welfare. Corporate welfare—the transfer of public funds and benefits to corporate actors with weak or no conditionality—is a prominent form of state-business relations that CPE scholarship regularly overlooks and misinterprets. Such transfers should be understood as a structural privilege of business in a globalized post-Fordist capitalism, and an increasingly common strategy through which states attempt to steward national economic dynamism within a highly constrained range of policy options. However, without a well-developed concept of corporate welfare—premised upon the key criterion of conditionality—studies that identify a “return” of the state in industrial planning misrepresent these transfers to business as a reassertion of state influence and control, rather than a reflection of state weakness and subordination. The paper provides the analytical building blocks to properly conceptualize transfers to business, works out the core challenges for empirical research, and provides empirical illustrations of this burgeoning phenomenon from the fields of unconventional monetary policy, privatization, and urban political economy.

中文翻译：

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无附加条件：企业福利、国家干预和条件问题

本文通过发展企业福利的分析概念，为比较政治经济学 (CPE) 做出了贡献。企业福利——将公共资金和福利转移给企业行为者，条件不强或无条件——是 CPE 学术经常忽视和曲解的一种突出的国企关系形式。这种转移应该被理解为全球化的后福特主义资本主义中企业的结构性特权，以及一种越来越普遍的战略，各国试图通过这种战略在高度受限的政策选择范围内管理国家经济活力。然而，如果没有一个完善的企业福利概念（以条件性的关键标准为前提），在工业规划中确定国家“回归”的研究将这些对企业的转移歪曲为重申国家影响和控制，而不是反映国家的弱点和从属地位。本文提供了正确概念化商业转移的分析构建块，解决了实证研究的核心挑战，并从非常规货币政策、私有化和城市政治经济领域提供了这一新兴现象的实证说明。