In this paper I conduct the first empirical analysis of the relationship between director compensation and private foundation performance. Using compensation data for over 17,000 private foundations across the period 1993 to 2017 I find that private foundations which choose to compensate their directors make smaller charitable distributions each year, and are also more likely to minimize their charitable distributions to the legal minimum over time. I also examine the association between compensated directors and foundation investment returns and find no relationship. Finally, I find that foundation director compensation is not a substitute for either employee compensation or outside professional fees.

在本文中，我对董事薪酬与私人基金会绩效之间的关系进行了第一次实证分析。使用 1993 年至 2017 年期间超过 17,000 家私人基金会的薪酬数据，我发现选择补偿其董事的私人基金会每年进行较小的慈善分配，并且随着时间的推移更有可能将其慈善分配降至法定最低限度。我还研究了带薪董事与基金会投资回报之间的关联，但没有发现任何关系。最后，我发现基金会董事薪酬不能替代员工薪酬或外部专业费用。