Inducement regulation is intended to target the conflict of interests between financial advisors and their clients. Nonetheless, it may also represent a ‘public policy device’ meant to conform the activity of European distributors with investor protection goals; indeed, by selecting the conditions under which distributors can freely collect inducements, the European regulator simultaneously shapes the market for financial services. Accordingly, ‘spot advice’ (which poorly performed in the past) is indirectly banned by the quality-enhancement provision set forth in art. 24 MiFID II, and the acknowledged importance of on-going monitoring of the portfolio opens up the collection of inducements linked to the provision of ‘periodic advice’. Since this new regime will probably increase the overall costs of investment advice enlarging the ‘advice gap’, the European regulator tries also to foster the development of FinTech permitting the collection of inducements even outside the strict provision of investment advice. Nevertheless, the concerns regarding investor protection raised by FinTech services (which allow only a mere ‘self-assessment’ of the investor’s profile) suggest a broader interpretation of inducement regulation, with the purpose of enabling investment firms to provide low-cost financial advice capable of effectively encompassing every stage of the investment relationship, from the early assessment of clients’ characteristics and objectives to the on-going management of the investments (‘simplified advice’).

中文翻译：

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由规则塑造。诱导监管将如何改变投资服务业

诱导监管旨在针对财务顾问与其客户之间的利益冲突。尽管如此，它也可能代表一种“公共政策手段”，旨在使欧洲分销商的活动符合投资者保护目标；事实上，通过选择分销商可以自由收取利益的条件，欧洲监管机构同时塑造了金融服务市场。因此，“现场建议”（过去表现不佳）被艺术中规定的质量提升条款间接禁止。24 MiFID II 以及持续监控投资组合的公认重要性开启了与提供“定期建议”相关的诱因集合。由于这种新制度可能会增加投资建议的总体成本，从而扩大“建议差距”，欧洲监管机构还试图促进金融科技的发展，即使在严格提供投资建议的情况下也允许收集诱因。尽管如此，金融科技服务（仅允许对投资者的个人资料进行“自我评估”）引发的对投资者保护的担忧表明对诱导监管的更广泛解释，目的是使投资公司能够提供低成本的财务建议有效地涵盖投资关系的每个阶段，从客户特征和目标的早期评估到投资的持续管理（“简化建议”）。