Foreign acquirers often encounter severe legitimacy challenges caused by the institutional distance between the home and host countries. In this study, we propose that conduit acquisition, in which an ultimate acquirer initiates a cross-border acquisition through one of its majority-owned subsidiaries already located in the host country or countries similar to the host country, can be used as a strategic response to institutional distance. Invoking institutional theory, we argue that the local presence of the conduit acquirer can help the ultimate acquirer interpret and meet the legitimacy requirements in the host country. This effect is weaker if an ultimate acquirer has alternative sources of legitimacy and is stronger if the acquisition triggers larger legitimacy concerns. Our empirical analyses of 6365 cross-border acquisitions in the United States from 2000 to 2016 support our hypotheses. We further find that conduit acquisition indeed lowers the deal failure rate and reduces the time to completion. By highlighting the organizational structure of cross-border acquisitions, this study points to a new strategic option for multinational enterprises.

由于母国和东道国之间的制度距离，外国收购者经常遇到严重的合法性挑战。在本研究中，我们提出管道收购，即最终收购方通过其已位于东道国或与东道国类似国家的控股子公司之一发起跨境收购，可用作战略响应到制度距离。援引制度理论，我们认为管道收购方在当地的存在可以帮助最终收购方解释和满足东道国的合法性要求。如果最终收购方有其他合法性来源，这种影响会减弱，如果收购引发更大的合法性担忧，这种影响会更强。我们对 2000 年至 2016 年美国 6365 起跨境收购的实证分析支持了我们的假设。我们进一步发现，渠道收购确实降低了交易失败率并缩短了完成时间。本研究通过突出跨境收购的组织结构，为跨国企业指明了新的战略选择。