Abstract

The ability of states to exploit private resources at an international level is an increasingly salient political issue. In explaining the mechanisms of this shift, the framework of Weaponized Interdependence has quickly risen to prominence, arguing that those states that are centrally placed in global networks can exploit their centrality given the appropriate domestic institutions. Building on this framework, I suggest that the relationship between states and the private corporations holding the resources states seek to exploit is more dynamic and contested than assumed. Drawing on developments in the industry for constructing and operating submarine cables, I find that a paradigm shift in the market has significantly limited the authority of states vis-à-vis key market players. The contribution of this finding is to expand Weaponized Interdependence as a framework, paying closer attention to the relationship between private companies and states. This expansion allows for the utilization of Weaponized Interdependence as a framework for a broader set of cases, explaining not only when a network is prone to weaponization but also the limitations states face when they seek to do so.

摘要

国家在国际层面开发私人资源的能力是一个日益突出的政治问题。在解释这种转变的机制时，武器化相互依存的框架迅速崛起，认为那些处于全球网络中心的国家可以利用适当的国内制度发挥其中心地位。在此框架的基础上，我建议国家与持有国家寻求开发的资源的私营公司之间的关系比假设的更具动态性和争议性。借鉴海底电缆建设和运营行业的发展，我发现市场模式的转变极大地限制了国家对主要市场参与者的权威。这一发现的贡献是将武器化的相互依存扩展为一个框架，更加关注私营公司与国家之间的关系。这种扩展允许利用武器化相互依存作为更广泛案例集的框架，不仅解释了网络何时容易武器化，还解释了各国在寻求这样做时面临的局限性。