In this essay, we put forth a novel solution to Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, utilizing recent work done by Duncan Pritchard on radical skepticism. Key to the success of Plantinga’s argument is the doubting of the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties. We argue (viz. Pritchard and Wittgenstein) that the reliability of one’s cognitive faculties constitutes a hinge commitment, thus is exempt from rational evaluation. In turn, the naturalist who endorses hinge epistemology can deny the key premise in Plantinga’s argument and avoid the dilemma posed on belief in the conjunction of naturalism and evolution.

在这篇文章中，我们利用邓肯·普里查德（Duncan Pritchard）最近在激进怀疑论方面所做的工作，为普兰廷加的进化论反对自然主义提出了一个新的解决方案。Plantinga 的论点成功的关键是怀疑一个人的认知能力的可靠性。我们认为（即 Pritchard 和 Wittgenstein）一个人的认知能力的可靠性构成了一个铰链承诺，因此免于理性评估。反过来，支持铰链认识论的自然主义者可以否认普兰廷加论证中的关键前提，并避免在相信自然主义与进化论的结合时所面临的困境。