This paper addresses one of the three main themes of Neville’s The Goodness Is One, Its Manifestations Many: Whether Confucian ethics can be appropriately characterized as a virtue ethics. It first examines some unique features of virtues ethics, concluding that Confucian ethics may be plausibly regarded as a virtue ethics. Then it shows that virtue ethics is immune to the two diseases that Neville worries about: subjectivism and individualism. Finally, it argues that what Neville regards as salient features of Confucian ethics, (1) situationism, (2) attention to knowledge and skills beyond virtues, and (3) consequentialism of principle, can all be kept intact when it is characterized as a virtue ethics.

中文翻译：

---

为什么儒家伦理是德伦理，德伦理不是坏事，纳威应该赞同

本文探讨了内维尔的《善为一，其表现多》的三个主题之一：儒家伦理是否可以恰当地描述为美德伦理。它首先考察了美德伦理的一些独特特征，得出的结论是，儒家伦理可以被视为一种美德伦理。然后它表明美德伦理对内维尔担心的两种疾病免疫：主观主义和个人主义。最后，它认为内维尔认为的儒家伦理的显着特征，（1）情境主义，（2）对超越美德的知识和技能的关注，以及（3）原则的后果主义，当它被描述为美德伦理。