ABSTRACT

Are some conventional military units better equipped to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations than others? COIN theorists and practitioners disagree about mechanization’s impact on COIN effectiveness. We suggest that mechanization is not the critical determinant of COIN effectiveness. Rather, mechanization’s effects vary based on a unit’s force employment approach within local scope conditions. To test our hypothesis, we explore how mechanization impacts COIN operations in Ramadi and Basra and find that force employment is the critical determinant in COIN effectiveness. We introduce an adaptive force employment hypothesis that outlines how mechanization includes costs to exposing dismounted troops and benefits in information-sharing, conditional on local insurgent strength. This hypothesis suggests that mechanized forces provide significant benefits to counterinsurgents when clearing high strength insurgents, outweighing benefits from dismounted civilian interaction. Following successful clearance operations when government control is increased and insurgent strength is reduced, requirements for armored protection decrease while civilian tips become increasingly important to target remaining insurgents. In the hold and build stages, counterinsurgents can increasingly rely on dismounted troops.

摘要

一些常规军事单位是否比其他单位更有能力进行平叛（COIN）行动？COIN 理论家和实践者对机械化对 COIN 有效性的影响存在分歧。我们认为机械化不是 COIN 有效性的关键决定因素。相反，机械化的效果因部队在当地范围内的使用方式而异。为了检验我们的假设，我们探讨了机械化如何影响拉马迪和巴士拉的 COIN 运营，并发现部队使用是 COIN 有效性的关键决定因素。我们引入了一个适应性部队使用假设，该假设概述了机械化如何包括暴露下马部队的成本和信息共享中的好处，条件是当地的叛乱力量。这一假设表明，机械化部队在清除高强度叛乱分子时为反叛乱分子提供了显着的好处，超过了下马平民互动带来的好处。在政府控制增加而叛乱分子减少的情况下成功清除行动后，对装甲保护的需求减少，而平民提示对于瞄准剩余的叛乱分子变得越来越重要。在保持和建设阶段，反叛乱分子可以越来越依赖下马部队。对装甲保护的需求减少，而平民提示对于瞄准剩余的叛乱分子变得越来越重要。在保持和建设阶段，反叛乱分子可以越来越依赖下马部队。对装甲保护的需求减少，而平民提示对于瞄准剩余的叛乱分子变得越来越重要。在保持和建设阶段，反叛乱分子可以越来越依赖下马部队。