Abstract

This article presents an ex-post evaluation of the performance of Dutch Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) infrastructure projects compared to Design and Construct (D&C) contracts, which uses quantitative (financial project data and survey) and qualitative (interviews) data. Drawing on institutional theory, notably the economic institutionalism inspired-contractual perspective and the sociological institutionalism-oriented collaborative perspective, the evaluation focuses on four performance indicators—cost, time, quality, and innovation—and five public–private partnership (PPP) performance drivers—private financing, performance-dependent payments, bundling (i.e., the integrated nature of contracts), risk transfer, and collaboration. It was found that the DBFM projects performed similarly to, or better than, the D&C contracts. The impact of bundling on innovation was positive, while its impact on quality was inconclusive. The collaboration proved to be a strong driver for performance and innovation but was not stronger in DBFM projects compared to D&C projects. Over time, collaboration and performance improved suggesting that besides project characteristics, PPP performance is influenced by the way actors deal with contracts and by the gradual process by which they learn to do so. Theoretically, this means that historical institutionalism is part of the explanation of PPP performance.

摘要

本文介绍了一个事后与使用定量（财务项目数据和调查）和定性（访谈）数据的设计和建造 (D&C) 合同相比，评估荷兰设计-建造-财务-维护 (DBFM) 基础设施项目的绩效。借鉴制度理论，特别是经济制度主义启发的契约视角和社会学制度主义导向的协作视角，评估侧重于四个绩效指标——成本、时间、质量和创新——以及五个公私伙伴关系 (PPP) 绩效驱动因素——私人融资、绩效支付、捆绑（即合同的综合性质）、风险转移和协作。发现 DBFM 项目的表现与 D&C 合同相似或更好。捆绑对创新的影响是积极的，而对质量的影响尚无定论。事实证明，这种合作是绩效和创新的强大推动力，但与 D&C 项目相比，DBFM 项目的表现并不强。随着时间的推移，协作和绩效得到改善，这表明除了项目特征外，PPP 绩效还受到参与者处理合同方式以及他们学会这样做的渐进过程的影响。从理论上讲，这意味着历史制度主义是 PPP 绩效解释的一部分。合作和绩效的改善表明，除了项目特征外，PPP 绩效还受到参与者处理合同方式以及他们学习这样做的渐进过程的影响。从理论上讲，这意味着历史制度主义是 PPP 绩效解释的一部分。合作和绩效的改善表明，除了项目特征外，PPP 绩效还受到参与者处理合同方式以及他们学习这样做的渐进过程的影响。从理论上讲，这意味着历史制度主义是 PPP 绩效解释的一部分。