Abstract

We analyze a model of bargaining in the shadow of coups d’état in which oil rents increase the value of capturing the state but also allow leaders to coup-proof their governments and appease potential plotters. These mechanisms offset each other once oil wealth has already been realized; incentives to topple the government are countered by the government’s capacity to thwart or discourage coups. But when oil is newly discovered and rents have not yet been realized, plotters may launch a coup before the government can use oil wealth to shift the distribution of power decisively against them. Coup attempts are uniquely likely in such windows of opportunity, but those same coup attempts are also likely to fail. We uncover these relationships in an empirical analysis of oil production, oil discovery, coup attempts, and coup outcomes in a global sample of states from 1980 to 2010.

摘要

我们分析了一个在政变阴影下讨价还价的模型，在该模型中，石油租金增加了夺取国家的价值，但也使领导人能够抵御政变并安抚潜在的阴谋者。一旦石油财富已经实现，这些机制就会相互抵消；政府阻止或阻止政变的能力抵消了推翻政府的动机。但是，当新发现石油并且尚未实现租金时，阴谋者可能会在政府利用石油财富果断地改变权​​力分配对他们不利之前发动政变。在这样的机会窗口中，政变企图是独一无二的，但同样的政变企图也可能会失败。我们在对石油生产、石油发现、政变企图的实证分析中揭示了这些关系，