Multilateral trust funds have become an increasingly prominent funding mechanism in international development. Yet marked differences exist in the extent to which donors support trust funds. In this study, we argue that differential support for trust funds originates in donor domestic politics. Specifically, it results from differences in national bureaucratic rulebooks that incentivise aid officials to support trust funds more or less. Because trust funds place a high premium on performance and results, aid officials from donor countries whose aid bureaucracies are set up to promote performance and results are more likely to support trust funds than their counterparts from aid bureaucracies that are less performance-oriented. We find robust support for differential use of trust funds in terms of incidence of usage, type of preferred fund and outsourcing behaviour, drawing on a data set of World Bank trust funds. Our project contributes to the understanding of international development cooperation by mapping donor political economies to the rise of trust fund usage. We also contribute to a better understanding of the global diffusion of performance-based evaluation.

多边信托基金已成为国际发展中日益突出的筹资机制。然而，捐助者对信托基金的支持程度存在显着差异。在这项研究中，我们认为对信托基金的不同支持源于捐助者的国内政治。具体来说，它是由于国家官僚规则手册的差异导致援助官员或多或少地支持信托基金。由于信托基金高度重视绩效和结果，与那些不太注重绩效的援助官僚机构相比，其援助官僚机构旨在促进绩效和结果的捐助国的援助官员更有可能支持信托基金。我们发现在使用频率方面对信托基金的差异使用提供强有力的支持，首选基金类型和外包行为，利用世界银行信托基金的数据集。我们的项目通过将捐助者政治经济与信托基金使用率的上升联系起来，有助于理解国际发展合作。我们还有助于更好地了解基于绩效的评估的全球传播。