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Thinking and being sure*
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ( IF 1.3 ) Pub Date : 2022-04-22 , DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12876
Jeremy Goodman 1 , Ben Holguín 2
Affiliation  

How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by ‘believe’. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we are sitting in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon — it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are not sure of. For example, you might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of ‘full belief’ intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure.

中文翻译:

思考并确定*

我们的信仰与我们的行为有何关系?这取决于我们所说的“相信”是什么意思。一方面,我们可以确定:我们的名字是什么,我们出生在哪里,我们是否坐在屏幕前。从这个意义上说,确定性并不少见——它并不意味着笛卡尔式的绝对确定性,任何可能的经验过程都不能将我们从这种确定性中驱逐出去。但是有很多事情我们认为我们不确定。例如,您可能认为本月某个时候会下雨,但不确定是否会下雨。我们确定的和我们认为的都与行动有重要的规范联系。但是连接是完全不同的。本文探讨了与断言、查询和决策制定相关的这些问题。
更新日期:2022-04-22
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