This paper brings to light an unexplored aspect of Hobbes’s argument that political authority rests upon subjects’ consent. Consent enacts a transfer of subjects’ right of nature to the sovereign, yet she already possesses a natural right to everything. What moral difference, then, does this make to her possession of power, and how? In my reading, the difference lies in the rise of new obligations befalling the sovereign by means of an indirect mechanism: That many individuals, hoping for safety, transfer their right of nature to the sovereign triggers an obligation for her to accept the role of a ruler and perform the duties attached to it, for the sake of the peace enjoined by the laws of nature. This reading should also confirm the possibility of a consensual foundation for the Hobbesian right to punish and shed new light on Hobbes’s notion of tacit consent.

中文翻译：

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霍布斯和政治同意的间接运作

本文揭示了霍布斯关于政治权威取决于臣民同意的论点的一个未被探索的方面。同意将臣民的自然权利转移给主权者，但她已经拥有对一切的自然权利。那么，这对她拥有权力有什么道德上的不同，又是如何产生的呢？在我看来，不同之处在于主权者通过间接机制承担的新义务的增加：许多希望获得安全的个人将他们的自然权转让给主权者，这触发了她接受主权者角色的义务为了自然法则所要求的和平，统治者并履行其职责。