The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We'll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least two ways. We must complicate the picture somehow. I consider two candidate complications. The first, Parity Monism, is inspired by Ruth Chang's suggestion that parity is a fourth comparative beyond the traditional three (>, <, =). This view complicates the single weight relation by allowing that the weights of reasons can be on a par. Unfortunately, Parity Monism resolves only one of the two paradoxes that afflict simple versions of Weight Monism. To resolve both paradoxes, we need our second candidate complication, Weight Pluralism. This view holds that reasons have at least two weight values (e.g., justifying weight and requiring weight) and these two values aren't always equivalent. Parity is no substitute for Pluralism.

中文翻译：

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均等、道德选择和理由的权重

一个行为的（道德）允许性取决于原因的相对权重，或者我假设如此。但是一个原因有多少权重呢？权重一元论认为原因具有单一的权重值。原因很重要。最简单的版本认为每个原因的权重要么大于、小于或等于所有其他原因。我们将看到，这个简单的观点至少会以两种方式导致悖论。我们必须以某种方式使情况复杂化。我考虑了两个候选并发症。第一个是 Parity Monism，灵感来自 Ruth Chang 的建议，即 parity 是超越传统三个（>、<、=）的第四个比较级。这种观点通过允许原因的权重可以相提并论而使单一权重关系复杂化。很遗憾，奇偶一元论只解决了困扰权重一元论简单版本的两个悖论之一。为了解决这两个悖论，我们需要我们的第二个候选并发症，权重多元论。这种观点认为，理由至少有两个权重值（例如，证明权重和要求权重），并且这两个值并不总是相等的。平等不能替代多元主义。