Strict liability imposed on firms involved in an imperfect competition game (here duopoly) is not an obstacle to achieving a socially optimal care level of care. However, when one input becomes scarce (here a limited generic asset), the precedent result is compromised. Duopolistic competition leads to supply more goods at a lower price at the equilibrium, but also a lower care level compared to a monopoly placed in similar conditions. When damage are too high, capped strict liability coupled with an ex-ante regulation leads the firms to increase their care level. The weakest one may disappear letting the other one in monopoly situation.

中文翻译：

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严格的责任、稀缺的仿制药投入和双头垄断竞争

对参与不完全竞争博弈（此处为双头垄断）的公司施加的严格责任并不是实现社会最优护理水平的障碍。然而，当一个输入变得稀缺（这里是有限的通用资产）时，先前的结果就会受到影响。双头垄断竞争导致在均衡时以更低的价格供应更多的商品，但与处于类似条件下的垄断相比，护理水平也更低。当损失过高时，严格责任上限加上事前监管会导致公司提高护理水平。最弱的一个可能会消失，让另一个处于垄断地位。