Firms that wish to raise capital from external investors can signal favorable private information about their long-term prospects by publicly adopting a liberal accounting system that increases the probability of an overstated financial report. All else equal, the liberal bias deteriorates investors' ability to make efficient investment decisions, which increases the firm's cost of raising capital as investors price protect. But the fact that the firm is willing to adopt such a bias signals booming long-term prospects, which ultimately allows the firm to raise capital at more favorable terms. We also study the effects of accounting standards that require firms to generate unbiased financial reports. Unbiased reporting leads to efficient investment decisions but prevents firms from signaling private information, which reduces their incentive to improve long-term prospects. We find that giving firms discretion over reporting choices is optimal in innovative industries, whereas enforcing unbiased reporting is optimal in traditional industries.

希望从外部投资者那里筹集资金的公司可以通过公开采用增加财务报告夸大可能性的自由会计制度来发出关于其长期前景的有利私人信息。在其他条件相同的情况下，自由主义偏见会降低投资者做出有效投资决策的能力，这会增加公司在投资者价格保护时筹集资金的成本。但该公司愿意采用这种偏见这一事实表明长期前景良好，这最终使该公司能够以更优惠的条件筹集资金。我们还研究了要求公司生成无偏见财务报告的会计准则的影响。公正的报告会导致有效的投资决策，但会阻止公司发出私人信息，这降低了他们改善长期前景的动力。我们发现，在创新行业中，让公司自行决定报告选择是最佳的，而在传统行业中执行公正的报告是最佳的。