ABSTRACT

We explain that most of the explanations that traditionally have been used to conceptually and ontologically differentiate aesthetic experience from any other are not compatible with a naturalistic framework, since they are based on transcendental idealistic metaphysics, reductions, and on the assumption that the aesthetic is an a priori special ontology in the object and the mind. However, contemporary works that propose as an alternative to apply directly evidence and theory from the science of emotions to the problem of aesthetics introduce Aesthetic Science into a new set of problematic assumptions. We argue that conceptually equating or ontologically reducing the aesthetic to the theory of rewards cannot provide a clear alternative for any Aesthetic Science to naturalize the aesthetic experience as a heterogeneous class of events that are not already explained by affective science. This practice introduces a serious danger of making the term “aesthetic” and the respective scientific field pretty weak or completely redundant and unnecessary.

摘要

我们解释说，传统上用于在概念上和本体论上将审美体验与任何其他体验区分开来的大多数解释都不符合自然主义框架，因为它们基于先验唯心主义形而上学、还原，以及审美是一种假设先验对象和思想中的特殊本体论。然而，提出将情感科学的证据和理论直接应用于美学问题的替代方案的当代著作将美学科学引入了一组新的有问题的假设中。我们认为，在概念上将美学等同于或在本体论上将美学还原为奖励理论，不能为任何美学科学提供明确的替代方案，将审美体验自然化为情感科学尚未解释的异质事件类别。这种做法带来了严重的危险，使“审美”一词和相应的科学领域变得非常薄弱或完全多余和不必要。