ABSTRACT

How do state sponsors of proxy groups in civil wars balance their support of non-state militias with the need for political transition towards stability? This article explores the inconsistencies in Iran’s priorities and proxy strategy that at times limited Iranian influence, and complicated Iraq’s transition from war to peace. It expands on current theories on proxy warfare by focusing on the impact of diverging interests among foreign policy elites in a sponsor state. Three policy dilemmas illustrate the difference among on the one side the Revolutionary Guard and on the other side the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Intelligence. First, whether the pro-Iranian proxies should maintain their influence after the war or Iran should strengthen its link to the representatives of the formal state. Second, whether repression by Shia militias or political reconciliation should prevent Sunni Arabs from (re)joining Islamic State. Third, whether Iraq should be part of a sectarian, transnational alliance or an inclusive state that might become an arbiter to deescalate regional tension. The study contributes to the literature on Iranian proxy warfare in the Middle East and proxy warfare literature in general, by considering the consequences of differences among foreign policy elites.

摘要

内战中代理人团体的国家赞助者如何平衡他们对非国家民兵的支持与政治过渡到稳定的需要？本文探讨了伊朗优先事项和代理战略的不一致，这些不一致有时会限制伊朗的影响力，并使伊拉克从战争到和平的过渡变得复杂。它通过关注赞助国外交政策精英之间不同利益的影响，扩展了当前关于代理战争的理论。三个政策困境说明了一方面是革命卫队，另一方面是外交部和情报部。首先，亲伊朗的代理人是应该在战后保持影响力，还是伊朗应该加强与正式国家代表的联系。第二，无论是什叶派民兵的镇压还是政治和解，都应该阻止逊尼派阿拉伯人（重新）加入伊斯兰国。第三，伊拉克是否应该成为一个宗派、跨国联盟或一个包容性国家的一部分，这可能成为缓和地区紧张局势的仲裁者。该研究通过考虑外交政策精英之间差异的后果，为中东伊朗代理战争的文献和一般代理战争文献做出了贡献。