ABSTRACT

It seems like people have character traits that explain a good deal of their behavior. Call a theory character realism just in case it vindicates this folk assumption. Recently, Christian Miller has argued that the way to reconcile character realism with decades of psychological research is to adopt metaphysical reductivism about character traits. Some contemporary psychological theories of character and virtue seem to implicitly endorse such reductivism; others resist reduction of traits to finer-grained mental components or processes; and still others remain silent on the metaphysics of traits. In this paper we argue that character realists do not have to, and in fact should not, be reductivists. We introduce a theoretical dilemma for reductivist character realism. Then we explain how nonreductivists can meet the standards for empirical adequacy laid out by Miller and others. Further, we argue, hylomorphic nonreductivism avoids the theoretical dilemma that threatens reductivism. It also fits nicely the major commitments of recent models of virtue in psychology. Thus, character realists should not be reductivists.

摘要

似乎人们的性格特征可以很好地解释他们的行为。称一个理论为现实主义，以防它证明这个民间假设是正确的。最近，克里斯蒂安·米勒 (Christian Miller) 认为，调和性格现实主义与数十年心理学研究的方法是采用关于性格特征的形而上学还原论。一些关于品格和美德的当代心理学理论似乎含蓄地支持这种还原论；其他人拒绝将特征简化为更细粒度的心理成分或过程；还有一些人对特质的形而上学保持沉默。在本文中，我们认为性格现实主义者不必，事实上应该不，是还原主义者。我们介绍了还原主义人物现实主义的理论困境。然后我们解释非还原论者如何满足米勒和其他人制定的经验充分性标准。此外，我们认为，质态非还原论避免了威胁还原论的理论困境。它也很好地符合心理学中最近的美德模型的主要承诺。因此，性格现实主义者不应该是还原主义者。