Can someone who suspends judgement about a certain proposition <p> be in a relational state of disagreement with someone who believes <p> as well as with someone who disbelieves <p>? This paper argues for an affirmative answer. It develops an account of the notions of suspended judgement and disagreement that explains how and why the suspender is in a relational state of disagreement with both the believer and the disbeliever about the very same proposition <p>. More specifically, the paper first provides a characterisation of the normative profile associated with the state of suspended judgement in terms of the set of normative commitments that it engenders in the context of inquiry. It then provides a characterisation of the notion of disagreement in terms the incompatibility between the sets of normative commitments characteristic of the three states in question—belief, disbelief, and suspension.

中文翻译：

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分歧和暂缓判决

对某个命题 <p> 暂停判断的人是否会与相信 <p> 的人以及不相信 <p> 的人处于不同意的关系状态？本文主张一个肯定的答案。它发展了对暂停判断和分歧的概念的描述这解释了悬吊者如何以及为什么在同一个命题上与信徒和非信徒都处于不同意的关系状态<p>。更具体地说，本文首先根据在调查背景下产生的一组规范性承诺来描述与暂停判断状态相关的规范性概况。然后，它根据所讨论的三个国家——相信、不相信和暂停——的规范性承诺集之间的不相容性，对分歧概念进行了描述。