In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, people across the United States protested that “too big to jail” banks were not held accountable after the financial crisis. Little has changed. Newly collected data concerning enforcement during the Trump Administration has made it possible to assess what impact a series of new policies has had on corporate enforcement. To provide a snapshot comparison, in its last twenty months, the Obama Administration levied $14.15 billion in total corporate penalties by prosecuting seventy-one financial institutions and thirty-four public companies. During the first twenty months of the Trump Administration, corporate penalties declined to $3.4 billion in total penalties, with seventeen financial institutions and thirteen public companies prosecuted. These trends build over time. In each year, blockbuster cases come and go, creating swings in fines. However, consistent with these data, this Article describes changes in written policy, practice, and informal statements from the Department of Justice that have cumulatively softened the federal approach to corporate criminals. This Article also describes continuity between administrations. A rise in corporate declinations, for example, represents a continuation of Obama Administration policy. A decline in use of corporate monitors similarly reflects prior policy. The steady and low level of individual charging in corporate cases reflects an ongoing lack of success in efforts to prioritize individual prosecutions, exemplified by the 2015 “Yates Memo.” That policy, like others, has been formally relaxed. The series of DOJ corporate prosecution policy changes has also been accompanied by institutional shifts. For example, high-level vacancies within the DOJ and other enforcement agencies may compromise ability to coordinate resolution of complex cases. This Article concludes by proposing structural changes, such as independent corporate enforcement functions, to enhance capacity and prevent pendulum shifts in enforcement. How we handle corporate crime goes to the root of power imbalances in the economy that produced the financial crisis. If we still have not learned the lessons of the last financial crisis, the next one cannot be far ahead.

中文翻译：

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拒绝公司起诉

在全球金融危机之后，美国各地的人们抗议金融危机后“太大而不能入狱”的银行没有被追究责任。变化不大。特朗普政府期间新收集的有关执法的数据使评估一系列新政策对公司执法的影响成为可能。为了提供一个快照比较，在过去的 20 个月中，奥巴马政府通过起诉 71 家金融机构和 34 家上市公司，征收了 141.5 亿美元的公司罚款总额。在特朗普政府执政的前 20 个月，公司罚款总额降至 34 亿美元，有 17 家金融机构和 13 家上市公司被起诉。这些趋势随着时间的推移而形成。在每一年，重磅案件来来去去，造成罚款的波动。然而，与这些数据一致，本文描述了司法部书面政策、实践和非正式声明的变化，这些变化累积地软化了联邦对企业犯罪的处理方式。本条还描述了主管部门之间的连续性。例如，企业衰退的增加代表了奥巴马政府政策的延续。公司监视器使用的减少同样反映了先前的政策。公司案件中个人指控的稳定和低水平反映了在优先考虑个人起诉方面持续缺乏成功，2015 年的“耶茨备忘录”就是一个例子。与其他政策一样，该政策已正式放宽。一系列 DOJ 公司起诉政策的变化也伴随着机构的转变。例如，司法部和其他执法机构的高级职位空缺可能会影响协调解决复杂案件的能力。本文最后提出了结构性变革，例如独立的公司执法职能，以提高能力并防止执法中的钟摆转变。我们如何处理公司犯罪是导致金融危机的经济中权力失衡的根源。如果我们还没有吸取上一次金融危机的教训，那么下一次金融危机就不可能遥遥领先。本文最后提出了结构性变革，例如独立的公司执法职能，以提高能力并防止执法中的钟摆转变。我们如何处理公司犯罪是导致金融危机的经济中权力失衡的根源。如果我们还没有吸取上一次金融危机的教训，那么下一次金融危机就不可能遥遥领先。本文最后提出了结构性变革，例如独立的公司执法职能，以提高能力并防止执法中的钟摆转变。我们如何处理公司犯罪是导致金融危机的经济中权力失衡的根源。如果我们还没有吸取上一次金融危机的教训，那么下一次金融危机就不可能遥遥领先。