The EU Damages Directive (2014) requires that compensation shall place a person who has suffered harm in the position in which that person would have been had the infringement of competition law not been committed, i.e., firms’ actions free of infringements serve as benchmark for specifying harm caused by deviations. The paper confronts this specification with game-theoretic models of market interaction. It is shown that firms are not necessarily deterred to form a cartel that coordinates action choice but non-deterred cartels turn out to be of less concern as they are at least welfare preserving if not enhancing. To implement damages rules that satisfy the Directive’s compensation requirement, courts must have sufficient information. When the actions taken by firms cannot be directly observed, implementing the compensation requirements remains possible only if the available evidence is sufficiently informative.

欧盟损害赔偿指令（2014 年）要求赔偿应使遭受损害的人处于如果没有违反竞争法的情况下该人将处于的位置，即，公司的无侵权行为可作为基准指定偏差造成的损害。这篇论文用市场互动的博弈论模型来面对这个规范。结果表明，企业不一定会被阻止形成协调行动选择的卡特尔，但未阻止的卡特尔被证明不太受关注，因为它们至少是福利维护，如果不增强。为了实施满足指令赔偿要求的损害赔偿规则，法院必须有足够的信息。当企业采取的行动不能被直接观察到时，