This study investigates how the institutional complexity of a multinational corporation (MNC) impacts its accounting quality. Toward that end, we employ a unique sample of MNCs registering subsidiaries in offshore financial centers (OFCs). Our focus is the tension between external governance mechanisms (i.e., US cross-listing, home-country institutional context) and internal governance mechanisms (OFC subsidiaries). Consistent with the corporate governance bonding hypothesis, we show that cross-listed MNCs exhibit higher accounting quality compared to non-cross-listed MNCs. However, the positive association between cross-listing and accounting quality is negatively moderated by an MNC’s choice of OFC subsidiaries, thereby suggesting that the internal governance mechanisms of MNCs interact with external mechanisms to impact its accounting quality. Moreover, an MNC’s OFC choice negatively moderates the relationship between home-country governance and accounting quality, thus lending further support to corporate governance arbitrage hypothesis. Our study underscores, to regulators and investors concerned about opportunistic earnings management, the importance of enhancing monitoring efforts for MNCs with opaque and complex governance that exhibits international mobility.

本研究调查跨国公司 (MNC) 的制度复杂性如何影响其会计质量。为此，我们采用了在离岸金融中心 (OFC) 注册子公司的跨国公司的独特样本。我们关注的是外部治理机制（即美国交叉上市、母国制度背景）和内部治理机制（OFC 子公司）之间的紧张关系。与公司治理结合假设一致，我们表明与非交叉上市的跨国公司相比，交叉上市的跨国公司表现出更高的会计质量。然而，跨国公司选择 OFC 子公司时，交叉上市与会计质量之间的正相关关系受到负面影响，因此表明内部跨国公司的治理机制与外部机制相互作用，影响其会计质量。此外，跨国公司的 OFC 选择负向调节母国治理与会计质量之间的关系，从而进一步支持公司治理套利假设。我们的研究向关注机会主义盈余管理的监管机构和投资者强调了加强对具有国际流动性的不透明和复杂治理的跨国公司的监控工作的重要性。