The Evil God (EG) challenge alleges that because arguments used to support belief in a Good God (GG) can be mirrored by the EG hypothesis, then belief in the former is no more reasonable than belief in the latter. Thus, there is an epistemic symmetry between both hypotheses. This paper argues that one of the EG’s secondary traits, specifically his maximal possessiveness, would render it very likely, if not certain, that the EG would not create anything at all. By contrast, the GG would very likely create. Consequently, the existence of anything non-divine would generate a significant asymmetry between the hypotheses—one that favors the GG hypothesis. Moreover, strategies to overcome this argument fail, and as such, the EG challenge is severely undermined.

恶神 (EG) 挑战声称，因为用于支持相信善神 (GG) 的论据可以反映在 EG 假设中，所以相信前者并不比相信后者更合理。因此，两个假设之间存在认知对称性。本文认为，EG 的次要特征之一，特别是他最大的占有欲，即使不确定，也很可能导致 EG 根本不会创造任何东西。相比之下，GG 很可能会创建。因此，任何非神圣事物的存在都会在假设之间产生显着的不对称——这有利于 GG 假设。此外，克服这一论点的策略失败了，因此，EG 的挑战受到了严重破坏。