ABSTRACT

The so-called expertise defence against sceptical challenges from experimental philosophy has recently come under attack: there are several studies claiming to have found direct evidence that philosophers’ judgments in thought experiments are susceptible to erroneous effects. In this paper, we distinguish between the customary ‘immune experts’ version of the expertise defence and an ‘informed experts’ version. On the informed expertise defence, we argue, philosophers’ judgments in thought experiments could be preferable to those by the folk even if it were true that philosophers’ judgments are no less immune to confounders than judgments by the folk are. We present results from an experimental study comparing philosophers and non-philosophers (n = 484), which support this version of the expertise defence.

摘要

针对来自实验哲学的怀疑性挑战的所谓专业知识防御最近受到攻击：有几项研究声称已经找到直接证据表明哲学家在思想实验中的判断容易受到错误影响。在本文中，我们区分了专业防御的习惯性“免疫专家”版本和“知情专家”版本。我们认为，在知情的专业知识辩护中，哲学家在思想实验中的判断可能比普通人的判断更可取，即使的确，哲学家的判断对混杂因素的免疫力不亚于民间的判断。我们展示了一项比较哲学家和非哲学家 (n = 484) 的实验研究的结果，这些结果支持这个版本的专业知识辩护。